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Reply to Romero and Soria 
 
I think the notions of „context-shift‟ and „language-shift‟ (a special case of context-
shift) can be used to account for a wide array of semantic phenomena. Thus I once 
suggested to Robyn Carston that standard instances of metalinguistic negation such 
as Larry Horn‟s example, „I did not buy tométoes, I bought tomatoes‟, could perhaps 
be handled by viewing the speaker as pretending that those are two different words 
with different meanings (rather than two different pronunciations of the same word). 
This would be a case of shift to an imaginary context — a context in which there are 
two distinct things : tomatoes and tométoes, and two different words for them. 
Romero and Soria think metaphor can be handled by appealing to context-
shift. According to them, the metaphorical vehicles are given new senses — senses 
which make them applicable to the metaphorical targets. Those senses are the 
senses that the words have in the context to which we shift, when we interpret a 
metaphor. Such senses are not arrived at by loosening the literal meaning of the 
words. « Metaphoric interpretation », they write, « is by no means a case of 
loosening. » It is a case of transfer : we go from the literal meaning of the words to 
some other meaning that is systematically related to it, namely the meaning the 
words have in the shifted context. 
More specifically, Romero and Soria write that metaphorical interpretation 
 
involves the analogical ability by which the interlocutors make a coherent 
partial mapping of a set of features from source domain to target domain to 
obtain a metaphorically restructured target domain. This mechanism affects the 
context from which we must interpret the utterance; in particular, it generates a 
new context of interpretation. This new context can be seen as a result of 
changing the parameter of language included in the actual context of 
utterance. When we identify a metaphoric use of language, we are prompted 
to change the meaning of some constituents of the sentence metaphorically 
used. 
 
In Foster‟s flying fish example, which they discuss at length, the apparently 
imperturbable English character is compared to the sea, which presents an even, 
uniform and opaque surface when seen from a distance, but reveals an internal life 
full of colour and dynamism when one looks beneath the surface. Seen from a 
distance, the sea “is of one color, and level, and obviously cannot contain such 
creatures as fish. But if we look into the sea over the edge of a boat, we see a dozen 
colors, and depth below depth, and fish swimming in them.” Similarly, the English 
character reveals unexpected features when one looks closer: “The depths and the 
colors are the English romanticism and the English sensitiveness — we do not expect 
to find such things, but they exist.” This mapping from the source domain (the sea) to 
the target domain (the English character) is completed by equating the fish swimming 
below the surface to the English emotions, “which are always trying to get to the 
surface, but don‟t quite know how.” Thus completed, the mapping provides the 
metaphorical context in which, Romero and Soria argue, we are to interpret the 
metaphorical sentences at the end of Foster‟s passage: 
 
For the most part we see them [the emotions] moving far below, distorted and 
obscure. Now and then they succeed and we exclaim, „Why, the Englishman has 
emotions! He actually can feel!‟ And occasionally we see that beautiful creature 
the flying fish, which rises out of the water altogether into the air and the sunlight. 
English literature is a flying fish. It is a sample of the life that goes on day after 
day beneath the surface; it is a proof that beauty and emotion exist in the salt, 
inhospitable sea. 
 
In this passage, elements of the target domain (the English character) are 
systematically described in terms of the source domain. For an emotion to be overtly 
expressed is for it to „get to the surface‟. Since the English emotions typically do not 
get expressed, we can only „see them moving far below, distorted and obscure‟. And 
so on and so forth. 
 According to R&S, metaphor starts with a conceptual conflict, due to the fact 
that vocabulary appropriate to one domain (the source) is used in talking about some 
other domain (the target). This conflict triggers a specific process of metaphorical 
interpretation. The first phase of metaphorical interpretation consists in setting up a 
mapping from source domain to target domain, which leads us to view the target 
domain through the lenses provided by the structure of the source domain. Once the 
mapping is in place, each relevant element in the source domain is associated with a 
corresponding element in the restructured target domain. This association creates a 
new, metaphorical context. In that context, each expression designating a relevant 
element in the source domain acquires a new semantic value, in virtue of which it 
refers to the corresponding element in the target domain. Thus R&S tell us that „flying 
fish‟, in the sentence „English literature is a flying fish‟, refers to “the only aspect of 
the apparently imperturbable English character that rises over the rest and glides 
showing a beauty and dynamism incomparable to any other”. Similarly, „salt and 
inhospitable sea‟ in the sentence „beauty and emotion exist in the salt, inhospitable 
sea‟ refers to the English character qua imperturbable and apparently unhospitable to 
emotions. The vehicles (expressions from the source domain) therefore convey „ad 
hoc concepts‟ corresponding to elements in the restructured target domain, i.e. 
elements of the target domain viewed through the lenses provided by the source 
domain. 
 Although I tend to agree with the overall picture, I have two objections, 
admittedly more technical than substantial. First, R&S‟s criticism of the view that 
metaphor proceeds through loosening seems to me exaggerated (at least when they 
claim that metaphor is « by no means » a case of loosening.) Second, their appeal to 
the notion of context-shift seems to me insufficiently motivated. 
 
* 
 
According to Romero and Soria, metaphor is an imaginative exercise in which we 
restructure a domain via a mapping from a source domain. As a result, we see the 
target domain „through the lenses‟ provided by the source domain. This clearly 
involves loosening: by using words that have their primary application in the source 
domain, the speaker forces the interpreter to adjust the meaning of those words so 
as to make them applicable to the target domain, and that involves filtering the 
inappropriate features so as to retain only what it common to the two domains. 
Romero and Soria say that, in the metaphorical context provided by Foster‟s analogy 
between the sea and the English character, „flying fish‟ means something like  „the 
only aspect of the apparently imperturbable English character that rises over the rest 
and glides showing a beauty and dynamism incomparable to any other‟. But in this  
paraphrase what „flying fish‟ specifically contributes is: „something that rises over the 
rest and glides showing beauty and dynamism‟. That can be got through loosening, 
by abstracting from the fishy nature of the flying fish, and retaining only the properties 
it has in common with English literature (in the metaphorical context). The further 
idea that the thing in question is „an aspect of the apparently impertubable English 
character‟ comes from the rest of the metaphorical mapping. 
Romero and Soria object that „rise over‟ does not literally apply to the English 
character: „English literature cannot literally rise over something‟. They conclude that 
the loosening account is only partly right : we get rid of certain inappropriate features 
(having to do with the fishy nature of the flying fish) but what we retain are not 
abstract features common to the two domains, but something else : 
 
 It is true that we select some properties of the normal concept and forget 
others and, in this sense, we can admit loosening. But this process of 
loosening cannot [select] the properties of the concept related to the 
metaphoric vehicle that can be attributed literally to the target because there 
are no such literal properties which can be applied to the target. We decide 
what part of the concept can be attributed to the target of the utterance, 
because this part will be able to change its meaning and be applied to the 
target. Metaphor does not only reduce the information of the concept 
represented by the metaphoric vehicle, but also changes the information 
associated with the remaining part so that it will fit with the target. Thus, we 
construct an ad hoc concept with a different application and not with a wider 
application. 
 
I think this goes too far. I do not accept that none of the properties encoded by 
the source expression literally apply to the target. Analogy making proceeds by 
extracting commonalities — so there must be commonalities, and it is those 
commonalities that are primarily retained in the selection process. 
Beside its beauty and exceptional character, the relevant property of the flying 
fish, Foster tells us, is that it „rises out of the water altogether into the air and the 
sunlight‟. This contrasts with two other sorts of fish: those that remain far below the 
surface and can only be seen „distorted and obscure‟, and those that succeed in getting 
to the surface but do not rise out of the water. The three-terms scale is preserved in the 
mapping: most English emotions go unexpressed, some are fugitively expressed, and 
English literature is a public, durable display of emotion and feeling. Even if we have 
trouble verbally expressing the features common to flishing fish and English literature, 
still they are there and they justify the metaphor. They also justify talk of loosening, 
since through the metaphor some, though not all, of the properties of the source are 
ascribed to the target. 
 What R&S‟s criticism shows is not that loosening is not involved in metaphor; it 
is centrally involved. But it is not all there is to metaphor. As Fauconnier and Turner 
have argued, four mental spaces are involved in metaphorical mappings: not only the 
source domain and the target domain, but also a „generic space‟ containing the 
abstract structure common to the two domains, and a „blended space‟ in which 
features from both domains mix and emergent features show up (Fauconnier and 
Turner 2002). The extraction of generic structure is a form of loosening, but the 
apparition of emergent features is a form of enrichment, and the imaginary mixing of 
features from both the source and the target is the most characteristic property of 
metaphor. That property is, indeed, irreducible to loosening. 
 
* 
 
 Contrary to Romero and Soria, I am not sure the notion of „language-shift‟ (a species 
of context-shift) is appropriate in dealing with metaphor. If we use it for dealing with 
metaphor, what will prevent us from using it also in dealing with metonymic transfer? 
After all, when the waiter associates a customer with the meal he has ordered and 
uses the name of the meal to refer to the customer, it would be possible to describe 
the situation as involving a shift to a new, „metonymic context‟ in which the words, 
say „ham sandwich‟, mean something different from what they mean in a standard 
context. But I think the notion of language-shift is best reserved for those cases in 
which tacit or explicit reference is made to some speaker or language user, to whom 
the speaker defers in his use of the words. No such thing seems to be involved in the 
sort of example discussed by R&S. To be sure, this makes their use of language-shift 
a possibly interesting extension or broadening of the notion, but I find this extension 
insufficently motivated. 
Language-shifts account for the some of the cases in which an expression 
means something different from what it standardly means. This is accounted for by 
saying that the speaker uses the expression with the sense that it has in some other 
context (a context in which a different language is spoken). In both metaphor and 
metonymy, an expression conveys something different from what it standardly 
means, but we do not need the to postulate a language-shift to account for this. We 
(more or less) know how to get from the literal meaning to the conveyed meaning. In 
metaphor, the correspondence established between the two domains makes the 
expressions appropriate to the source domain applicable (via the mapping) to the 
target domain, modulo loosening. We do not have to imagine a context in which the 
metaphorical meaning would be the literal meaning of the words.  
Note that the notion of language-shift is more powerful than what we need to 
account for metaphor. When a  language-shift is involved, there need not be any 
semantic commonality between the literal meaning of the words and their meaning in 
the shifted context. But in metaphor there always is some commonality, precisely 
because the metaphor relies upon an analogy between the source domain and the 
target domain rather than upon a deferential shift of language. 
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